solved? by which philosophy/philosopher? Wittgenstein?
@luannalovell -lol sounds like you’ve grasped it.
And then here is Searle on this: The climber “has no intention in action of loosening his hold. Even if on the basis of his belief and desire he formed a secondary desire to loosen his hold and this desire caused him to loosen his hold it is still not an intentional action if he does not have an intention in action to loosen his hold”.
Not that one has to find this reply satisfactory. But this context is what motivated the term “intention in action” – and McDowell doesn’t address it at all.
@runciblewall
Quoting Davidson: “A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. ” It’s not the case that, in this example, a prior intention ceases prematurely.
How does McDowell bring back Davidson’s puzzle? One simply says that the PI at issue ceases prematurely.
excellent work!
When Searle introduced the idea of an “intention in action” (IA), as distinct from the “prior intention” (PI) that causes it, he addressed a famous problem from Davidson: Namely, that sometimes our intentions are the cause of the intended effects, but the causation doesn’t happen “in the right way”. By introducing an IA in between PI and bodily movement, Searle could say exactly what is wrong here: IA is missing. McDowell’s claim here that IA’s are just PI’s brings back Davidson’s puzzle.
is this a funeral?
lol i my intention is to execute the intention to perform the prior action of intention to watch this another day!
Worst philosophy lecture… ever!!
He actually sounds bored by himself! I’ve never seen that quite so pronounced in any other philosopher than here with McDowell. It’s unbelievable. He might as just be saying out loud “God this is so fucking boring” every few minutes.
most contemporary philosphers, like campbell, searle, fodor etc are soo ignorant of true philosophy, their philosphy compared to that of kant is like scholasticism to aristotle. they write mad non-sense about freedom of will, artificial intelligence and brain states even though most of these ‘problems they try to solve have been long ago solved
any more McD?
One has a better time with McDowell if one has a firm grasp of Kant, so I’ve come to learn.
I watched this a while back and came to the conclusion that his intention is to look at his notes.
Reading him is ok, but listening to him can be pure torture.
John McDowell’s work in metaethics is so difficult to understand. I hate reading him! But the work is worth it. Great video.
great lecture , i wish i was there to ask him
great speaker
brilliant! thanks for posting this lecture by McDowell.
To *langengro*. I don’t see the problem. DD’s problem was about a deviant causal chain: actions might not be intentional, even if the action is caused by an intention. Causal chains aren’t enough to make an action intentional. What in McD’s talk forces a denial of that? If PI is just IA, given the typical conditions, then McD can say the same. The issue is whether IA, as Searle but not McD understands it, is required for this kind of move.