YOU BOYS NEED TO GO OUTSIDE AN LIVE!
Meanwhile IN THE REAL WORLD!
You all both fucking annoying and enlightening at the same time.
STFUKTX Carry On Please.
Am I flaming or not?
Always comes back to the god bullshit
S may say (p & ~p) is not a dialetheia, or, ~(p & ~p). But Q may ask how do we know ~(p & ~p) & (p & ~p) is not a dialetheia? S will have to again respond ~[~(p & ~p) & (p & ~p)]. Nevertheless, how does Q know ~[~(p & ~p) & (p & ~p)] & [~(p & ~p) & (p & ~p)] is a dialetheia? And so forth ad infinitum. In order to avoid trivialism, a dialetheist must bring this regress to an end. In fact Priest must use the classical negation. (Note how Priest defines “true” in FDE: True and “not” also false.)
To answer your question, Elimisteve, no, dialetheism is indefensible for it must make use of the precise thing it seeks to reject, namely, the classical negation. Consider the following: If S asserts some proposition, p, Q may deny p by asserting ~p. Now let’s presume S is a dialetheist, and thus (p & ~p) is, for him, at the very least logically possible. However, let’s presume further S does not hold (p & ~p) to be a dialetheia. How might S ensure Q that (p & ~p) is not a dialetheia?
What about zeroth-order logic? what about second-order, or higher order calculi? What about multi-sorted logics? When you talk about using a formal system for establishing the validity or consistency (not both the same thing, in this case) of linguistic statements you are tacitly assuming a model (a set, and a relation) that is valid for some given domain. What is this domain? Also you should take into account Tarski’s definability theorem with regards to whatever truth criterion you have.
This interpretation of Gods existence and simultaneous non-existence solves many issues in theological debate, without violating the dogma and inherent qualities of God himself. I think its an interesting take. In fact, one could assert that, as the Creator, he created logic itself. Therefore no logic is applicable to him.
Arent contradictions permitted in quantum logic? And to think, they dont merely represent concepts and propositions, but physical qualities! Yes, I think a contradiction can be valid. You used the example of God. Consider this… God created existence. Therefore he doesnt exist… because if he did, he would be a subset of the existence that he created. That would be a paradox indeed. But not so if you allow God to “be” external to existence itself.
watch yourself, my friend (see 5:07-5:11). for any proposition alpha: to assert both alpha and not-alpha is not the same as to both assert alpha and deny alpha, at least not according to any paraconsistent logic.
I agree completely. Paraconsistent logic is a mere entertainment. There is no problem with real logic (”classical,” if one insists) that requires this kind of revision; real logic hasn’t run into any wall due to rejecting self-contradictory ideas. The liar’s paradox is FAULTY, not true or false, and the statement “John is in the room” when he’s halfway in is simply insufficiently defined, not “sort-of true.”
While I see no harm in examining the idea of paraconsistent logic, I’m astounded that any sapient person would assert its validity. I have yet to see an actual example of a dialetheia. There are poorly-defined statements, sentences that are not really statements, pseudo-statements that are faulty (the liar’s paradox) rather than true or false, but no contradictions. It can even be argued fairly easily that it is impossible to truly experience a real logical contradiction beyond mere faultiness.
Its possible in a wuantum system to for more than one value to be accommodated simultaneously. If the brain or mind utilises this system then it is possible to have both true and false at the same time.
contradictions are concepts. concepts are within the human mind. if the human mind can conceive of true contradictions, then they exist, if it can’t then they don’t. it is said that, nothing can be true and false in the same respect. define the same respect. that’s a difficult task, because if you break it down, you break it down to general concepts. concepts are within the human mind, maybe it’s all a matter of opinion after all. maybe not. this is an opinion, which is a concept. no dogma, ever
Your reference to paraconsistent logics is too vaque to be considered.
It makes no sense, in any logic, to say that p&~p is true.
both you and priest ignore free logic, the hottest logic around today.
Excellent video. I will need to research dialethiae (spelling?).
cgo – this is one possible interpretation of the paradox. whats wrong with you.
Which leads into my second question, which concerns these “true contradictions”. Dialethic logic denies the law of non-contradiction, and so says that (p^~p) is valid. When it subsequently makes the claim that there are “true contradictions”, does it not necessarily assume there are also not-true contradictions? It seems this is actually the law of non-contradiction again, just in guise.
Interesting question at the end, I suppose one would have to show that it is a dialethia via very tightly knit logic, like the liar sentence does. Many seemingly dialethias are actually just two distinct observations both under an umbrella of ambiguity.
I have some questions of my own: Firstly, why is it that one must conclude that a dialethia such as the liar sentence is both true and false and not NEITHER true nor false. And is there a difference?
Your nonsense is disturbing.
There is no (possible) proposition that is both true and false.
The liar paradox, assures us that there has been a logical mistake in our reasoning.
That is, there are no paradoxes at all.
The statement that,’This statement is false’ is not a proposition that is either true or false, indeed it has no truth or falsity.
It is not a proposition.
Paradoxes do not exist in logic.
Apparent paradoxes show aome logical wrondoing.
yea there isnt really much content.
No its that both sentances have no actual content. So if sentance X is about sentance Y and sentance Y is ultimately about nothing then so is sentance X since its only subject is sentance Y.
so a sentence is meaningless if it states hte truth of another sentence?
I think in that case its the same issue just extended into an antecedent so now its two contentless propositions that reference each other.
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Part of the Sentence cannot Refer to the sentence as a whole